CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC DESIGN

Celebrating the foundation of the

Society for Economic Design (SED)

22-27 June, 2000

Istanbul, Turkey

Preliminary Program (Updated: 20 June 2000)

Daily Schedule:
Morning Sessions  9:00 – 11:00
Coffee 11:00 – 11:30
Plenary Session 11:30 – 12:30
Early Afternoon Sessions 14:00 – 16:00
Coffee 16:00 – 16:30
Late Afternoon Sessions 16:30 – 18:30

There will be three parallel sessions throughout the conference.

June 23

8:30 Welcome (M.R. Sertel)

Society for Economic Design (P.R. Kleindorfer)

Morning

MATCHINGS AND INDIVISIBLES (organized by A. Alkan)

Chair: G. Koshevoy (CEMI, Moscow)

Ahmet ALKAN (Sabanci U)

Discrete Revealed Preference and Lattice of Stable Multipartner Matchings

Vladimir DANILOV (CEMI, Moscow), Gleb Koshevoy, Kazuo Murota

Discrete Convexity and Equilibria in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Money

Aljosa FELDIN (U Ljubljana)

Core Convergence in Two Sided Matching Markets: Computational and Theoretical Approach

Dorothea HERREINER (U Bonn), C. Puppe

A Simple Procedure for Finding Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION

Chair: M. Bac (Bilkent U and U Chicago)

Benan Zeki ORBAY (Istanbul Technical U), Öner Günçavdi

Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Cournot and Stackelberg Markets

Randal HEEB (INSEAD)

Inovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets

Nikolaos VETTAS (Duke U), Kamal Saggi

On Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition: The Strategic Role of Fees and Royalties

Mehmet BAC (Bilkent U and U Chicago), Parimal Kanti Bag

Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns

PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS I ( P. Kleindorfer)

Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)

Fouad BENDIMERAD (Risk Management Solutions, Merlo Park)

Risk Quantification and Seismic Hazards in the Aegean Region

Mustafa ERDIK (Bogazici U)

Earthquake Risk Assessment and Mitigation in Istanbul

Howard KUNREUTHER ( U Penn)

Public-Private Partnerships in Promoting Cost-Effective Mitigation for Seismic Risks

Tuðrul TANKUT ( Middle East Technical U)

Structural and Educational Dimensions of Earthquake Mitigation in Turkey

Paul KLEINDORFER (U Penn)

Establishing Insurance Markets for Seismic Risks

 

PLENARY SESSION (Matthew Jackson)

Efficiency and the Formation of Communication and Exchange Networks

Early Afternoon

BARGAINING I

Chair: C. Herrero (U Alicante)

Antonio NICOLO (U Autonoma Barcelona and U Padova), A. Perea

A Non-Welfarist Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Situations

Benan Zeki ORBAY (Istanbul Technical U)

Kalai-Smorodinsky and Mashler-Perles Solutions under Pre-Donation

Alexander SOTSKOV (CEMI, Moscow)

A Nash Axiomatization of Competitive Decisions

Carmen HERRERO (U Alicante)

Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy

DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM

Chair: A. Villanacci (U Florence)

Erdem BAÞÇI (Bilkent U), Ýsmail Saðlam

Optimal Money Growth in a Limited Participation Model with Heterogeneous Agents

Nadjette LAGUECIR (U Zurich), Hubert Stahn

Sunspots and Incomplete Financial Markets: A Numeraire Asset Approach

Sonia WEYERS (INSEAD)

Convergence to Competitive Equilibria in a Double Auction

Erkan YALÇIN (Flinders U, Australia), David Kelsey

The Arbitrage Pricing Theorem with Incomplete Preferences

 

PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS II ( Paul Kleindorfer)

Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)

Attila ANSAL (Istanbul Technical U)

Micro-Zoning for Seismic Risk Quantification

Polat GULKAN (Middle East Technical U)

Turkish Development Law No.3194 and New Building Construction Supervision in Turkey

Joanna PAPOULIA (Institute of Oceanography, Athens)

Challenges in Marine Seismology in the Aegean Region

Rakesh SARIN (UCLA)

A Social Decision Analysis of the Earthquake Safety Problem: The Case of Existing Los Angeles Buildings

 

Late Afternoon

ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLES I

Chair: S. Papai (U Nova de Lisboa)

Lars EHLERS (Maastricht U)

Coalitional Strategy-proof House Allocation

Bettina KLAUS (U Nebraska at Lincoln), Lars Ehlers

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and the Probabilistic Uniform Correspondence

Ipek SANVER (Bogazici U), Murat R. Sertel

Manipulability of the Men-Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments

Jun WAKO (Gakushuin U)

Coalition-Proof Nash Allocation in a Barter Game with Multiple Indivisible Goods

EMPIRICAL AND OTHER STUDIES

Chair: A. Malawski (U Cracow)

Wietze LISE (Vrije U, Amsterdam)

Estimation of a Noncooperative Game

Bilin NEYAPTI (Bilkent U)

Quality of Bank Regulation and its Macroeconomic Effects: A Quantitative Analysis

Andrzej MALAWSKI (U Cracow)

Designing Schumpeterian Evolutionary Economics in the Arrow-Debreu Set-up

PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS III ( P. Kleindorfer)

Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)

Hasan BODUROGLU (Istanbul Technical U)

Considerations Behind Compulsory Insurance with Earthquake Coverage

Emil-Sever GEORGESCU (The National Building Research Institute, Bucharest)

Earthquake Risks and Insurance in Romania

Ayse ONCULER (INSEAD)

Decision Processes of Homeowners in Adopting Risk Mitigation Measures

Ioannis PAPADAKIS (U British Columbia), William Ziemba

Consequences of Earthquake Losses for Global Supply Chains: The Taiwan Experience

Andreas RICHTER ( Hamburg U ), Martin Nell

Alternative Risk Transfer Mechanisms for Seismic Risks

 

June 24

Morning

AUCTIONS I

Chair: G. D. Varma (Duke U)

Archishmann CHAKRABORTY (CUNY), Nandini Gupta, Rick Harbaugh

First Impressions in Sequential Auctions

Sander ONDERSTAL (Tilburg U)

Auctions with Network Externalities

Gopal Das VARMA (Duke U)

Standard Auctions with Identity Dependent Externalities

MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND APPLICATIONS I (C.D. Aliprantis)

Chair: B. Allen ( U Minnesota)

Yasar BARUT (Rice U)

Existence and Computation of Equilibrium in Stochastic Heterogeneous Agent Growth Model

Bernard CORNET (U Paris I)

Spatial Economies

Hajime HORI (Tohoku U)

Non-paternalistic Altruism and Utility Interdependence

Efe OK (NYU), Tapan Mitra

Extending Stochastic Dominance Relations via Expected Utility Theory

CORPORATE FINANCE (H. Orbay)

Chair: H. Orbay (Sabanci U)

Bjorn JORGENSEN (Harvard BS)

Discretionary Risk Disclosures

Murat USMAN (Koc U)

Debt as a Remedy to the Hold-up Problem: A Multi-period Model with Debt Renegotiations

Bilge YILMAZ (Wharton, U Penn), Ernst Maug

Two-class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution

 

PLENARY SESSION (David Cass)

One Economist's Designs: What Asset Pricing Theory Can- and Should!- Learn From Financial Equilibrium Theory

Early Afternoon

RIGHTS AND IMPLEMENTATION (M. R. Sertel)

Chair: M.R. Sertel (Bilkent U and Bogaziçi U)

Michael D. INTRILIGATOR ( UCLA), Dagobert L. Brito

Congestion of the Turkish Straits: A Market Alternative

Peter S. FAYNZILBERG (Northwestern U)

Participation Rights and Mechanism Design

Gianpaolo ROSSINI (U Bologna), Michele Moretto

Taking Closure Decision Efficiently

Walter TROCKEL (U Bielefeld)

Embedding the Nash Program into Implementation Theory

MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND APPLICATIONS II (C.D. Aliprantis)

Chair: C.D. Aliprantis (Purdue U)

Beth ALLEN (U Minnesota)

On Process Planning with Multiple Agents: How to Decide Which Process Plan to Use

Peter BARDSLEY (U Melbourne)

Multi-task Agency : A Combinatorial Model

Melike BULU (U Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Levon Barseghyan, Nicholas Yannelis

On Coalitionally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocations

Myrna WOODERS (U Warwick), Alexander Kovalenkov

Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments

EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS ( T. Saijo)

Chair: T. Saijo (Osaka U)

Peter BOHM (Stockholm U), Björn Carlén

Efficient Approaches to Making International Emissions Trading Attractive to Non-Rich Countries: Theory and Experiment

Yan CHEN (U Michigan)

An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms

Tatsuyoshi SAIJO (Osaka U), Yoichi Hyzen, Takao Kusakawa, Hidenori Niizawa

Finding 'No-Regret' Strategy in GHG Emissions Trading Institutions in the Kyoto Protocol: An Experimental Approach

 

Late Afternoon

AUCTIONS II

Chair: M. Olson (U Arizona)

Yumiko BABA (Aoyamagakuin U)

Auctions with Heterogeneous Sellers

Ottorino CHILLEMI (U Padova)

On Non Tough Competition

Ali HORTACSU (Stanford U)

An Empirical Analysis of Strategic Bidding in Turkish Treasury Bill Auctions

NETWORK DESIGN ( B. Dutta, M. Jackson) (16:30 - 17:30)

Chair: B. Dutta (ISI, New Delhi)

Sergio CURRARINI (U London), Massimo Morelli

Network Formation with Sequential Demands

Robert P. GILLES (Virginia Tech U), Edward Droste, Cathleen Johnson

Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY I (17:30 - 18:30)

Chair: V. Kreps (IME, St. Petersburg)

Belén JEREZ (U Autonoma Barcelona)

General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: A Dual Approach

Viktoria KREPS (IME, St. Petersburg), Victor Domanski

Social Equilibria for Competitive Resource Allocation Models

TOPICS IN REGULATION I

Chair: Ü. Zenginobuz (Bogaziçi U)

Peter S. FAYNZILBERG (Northwestern U)

Optimal Selection of a Regulated Monopoly

Zivan FORSHNER (U Haifa)

Agency Spaces

Anne YVRANDE (U Paris, Sorbonne)

Regulatory Reform and Standardisation: The Case of the British Rail Industry

E. Ünal ZENGINOBUZ (Bogazici U), Haldun Evrenk

Using Revenue Contests in Yardstick Regulation

 

June 26

 

 

Morning

BARGAINING II ( C. Ponsati)

Chair: C. Ponsati (U Autonoma Barcelona)

Pablo AMAROS (U Malaga), Bernardo Moreno

Bargaining with Commitments

Joan M. ESTEBAN (IAE, Barcelona), J Sakovics

Why do Lions Get the Lion' s Share: A Hobbesian Theory of Bargaining

Özgür KIBRIS (Sabanci U and CORE)

Truthful Representation of Utilities in Multicoalitional Bargaining

Clara PONSATI (U Autonoma Barcelona)

Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY II ( A. Villanacci)

Chair: A. Villanacci (U Florence)

Svetlana BOYARCHENKO (U Penn)

On Arrow' s Theorem in a Model with Neo-classical Firms

Alessandro CITANNA (HEC)

Moral Hazard and Linear Contracts: Economies with Idiosyncratic Risks

Herve CRES (HEC)

Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem

Birgit GRODAL (U Copenhagen), Hildegard Dierker, Egbert Dierker

The Objective of an Imperfectly Competitive Firm and Constrained Efficiency

TOPICS IN REGULATION II ( P. Kleindorfer)

Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)

Semih KORAY (Bilkent U), Harun Bulut

Regulation Through Supply and Demand Function Equilibria

Thomas KUHN (Chemnitz U), Karen Pittel

Incentive Compatible Regulation of Quality Provision by Natural Monopolies: The Role of Technical Progress

Wietze LISE (Vrije U, Amsterdam), Alberto Garrido, Eva Iglesias

A Game Model of Farmer' s Demand for Irrigation Water from Reservoirs in Southern Spain

Paul KLEINDORFER (U Penn), Michael A. Crew

Incentive Regulation: Failure of Commitment or Economic Design?

PLENARY SESSION (C.D. Aliprantis)

Equilibrium Theory With Non-Linear Prices

Early Afternoon

 

COALITION FORMATION ( F. Bloch)

Chair: F. Bloch (U Louvain)

Nadia BURANI (Barcelona Autonoma), William Zwicker

Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences

Sylvie THORON (GREQAM)

A Sequential Model of Coalition Formation

Sang Seung YI (Sogang U)

Endogeneous Formation of Economic Coalitions: A Survey on the Partition Function Approach

Francis BLOCH (U Louvain)

Agenda Control in Coalition Formation

SOCIAL CHOICE I

Chair: J. Laine (ENSAI)

Gleb KOSHEVOY (CEMI; Moscow)

Non-binary Social Choice and Closure Operators with the Anti-Exchange Property

Somdeb LAHIRI (IIM, Ahmedabad)

Axiomatic Characterizations of Some Solutions for Abstract Games

Laurent VIDU (U Caen)

The Minimal Quota for a Complete and Transitive Majority Relation

YunTong WANG (Sabanci U)

The Discrete Aumann-Shapley Method

APPLIED MECHANISM DESIGN ( J. Ledyard)

Chair: S. Bhattacharya (LSE)

Leslie FINE (Caltech U)

Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined Value Trading Mechanisms

Mark OLSON (U Arizona)

FCC Auction Design: An Experimental Comparison of Package and Non-package Ascending Auctions

Szilvia PAPAI (U Nova de Lisboa)

Exchange in a General Market with Indivisible Goods

Sudipto BHATTACHARYA (LSE)

Delegated Portfolio Management, No Churning, And Relative Performance-Based Incentive/Sorting Schemes

Late Afternoon

ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLES II (T. Sönmez)

Chair: T. Sönmez (Koc U and U Michigan)

Atila ABDULKADIROGLU (Northwestern U), T. Sonmez

School Choice: A Solution to the Student Assignment Problem

Anna BOGOMOLNAIA(Southern Methodist U), Hervé Moulin

A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem

Szilvia PAPAI (U Nova de Lisboa)

Strategyproof Exchange of Indivisible Goods

Tayfun SONMEZ (Koc U and U Michigan), Atila Abdulkadiroglu

Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments

SOCIAL CHOICE II

Chair: S. Chatterji (ISI, New Delhi)

Ayca KAYA (Bilkent U), Semih Koray

A Characterization of Oligarchic Social Choice Rules

Erkut Yusuf ÖZBAY (Bogazici U)

Numerical Representation of Binary Relations With Multiplicative Error Function: The General Case

Shurojit CHATTERJI (ISI, New Delhi), Navin Aswal, Arunava Sen

Dictatorial Domains

IMPLEMENTATION I

Chair: T. Van Zandt (INSEAD)

Emanuela CARBONARA (U Oxford and U Bologna)

The Optimal Allocation of Power in Organizations

Shasikanta NANDEIBAM (U Birmingham)

Efficiency in Teams With Sub-Teams

Hannu VARTAINEN (U Helsinki)

A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-player Subgame Perfect Implementation

 

June 27

Morning

ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPLEXITY (Van Zandt)

Chair: B. Yilmaz (Wharton, U Penn)

Luis GARICANO (Chicago GBS)

Referrals

Hakan ORBAY (Sabancý U)

Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty

Timothy Van ZANDT (INSEAD)

Structure and Returns to Scale of Real-time Hierarchical Resource Allocation

SOCIAL CHOICE III

Chair: W. Gehrlein (U Delaware)

Emel FILIZ (Bogazici U)

A Structure of Joint Irreducible Sets for Classically Rationalizable Choice Operators

Jean LAINE (ENSAI), Gilbert Laffond

Single-Switch Preferences and the Ostrogorski Paradox

William GEHRLEIN (U Delaware)

Weighted Scoring Rules that Maximize Condorcet Efficiency

DESIGNING INTERGENERATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ( J. Esteban)

Chair: J. Esteban (IAE, Barcelona)

Michele BOLDRIN (Minnesota U), Ana Montes

The Intergenerational Welfare State: Public Education and Pensions

Nezih GÜNER (Penn State U)

An Economic Analysis of Family Structure: Inheritance Rules and Marriage Systems

Estephane ROTTIER (U Louvain), Geraldine Mahieu

Preferences Over Capital Income versus Labor Income Taxation

Aylin SECKIN (U Montreal)

Consumption with Habit Formation

 

PLENARY SESSION (Leonid Hurwicz)

Mechanism Design With and Without Games

Early Afternoon

ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN (S. Koray and A. Postlewaite)

Chair: W. Trockel (U Bielefeld)

Serdar GUNER (Bilkent U)

Power Inflection and Sensitivity in the Turkish (Grand) National Assembly

Ayça KARA (Bogazici U), Murat Sertel

Selecting a Social Choice Rule

Arkadii SLINKO (U Auckland)

The Majoritarian Compromise is Asymptotically Strategy-Proof

Bulent UNEL (Brown U), Semih Koray

A Characterization of Neutral Tops-Only Self-Selective Social Choice Rules

GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY III ( A. Villanacci)

Chair: B. Grodal (U Copenhagen)

Julio DAVILA (U Penn)

Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies

Esma GAYGISIZ (Middle East Technical U), Paul Madden

Coordination Failures Under Oligempory Where Firms Can Constrain Labour Supplies

Antonio VILLANACCI (U Florence), Ünal Zenginobuz

Private Provision of Public Goods and Non-Neutrality of Taxes

Birgit GRODAL (U Copenhagen), Karl Vind

Equilibrium with Arbitrary Market Structure

INCENTIVES AND TEAMS

Chair: R. Sanver (Bilgi U)

Emanuela CARBONARA (U Oxford and U Bologna)

Corruption and Decentralisation

Görkem ÇELÝK (Northwestern U)

Interested Experts: Do They Still Know More Than the Rest of Us?

Hans GERSBACH (U Heidelberg)

Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem

Late Afternoon

COALITIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY MODELS

Chair: O. Yilankaya (UBC, Vancouver)

M. Socorro PUY (U Malaga)

Equilibrium in Mobility and Redistribution Economies

Remzi SANVER (Bilgi U), Göksel Asan

Coalition Structural Games and The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods

José L. TORRES (U Malaga), Bernardo Moreno

Economic Unions and Output Subsidies

Okan YILANKAYA (UBC, Vancouver), Eddie Dekel, Jeffrey C. Ely

Evolution of Preferences

IMPLEMENTATION II

Chair: A. Slinko (U Auckland)

Haruo IMAI (Kyoto U)

Constrained Bargaining Problems

Ayça KAYA (Bilkent U), Semih Koray

A Characterization of Solution Concepts Which Only Implement Monotonic Social Choice Rules

Hannu VARTAINEN (U Helsinki)

Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Full Characterization for the Many-player Case

Naoki YOSHIHARA (Hitotsubashi U)

On Efficient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games