CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC DESIGN
Celebrating the foundation of the
Society for Economic Design (SED)
22-27 June, 2000
Istanbul, Turkey
Preliminary Program (Updated: 20 June 2000)
Morning Sessions | 9:00 11:00 |
Coffee | 11:00 11:30 |
Plenary Session | 11:30 12:30 |
Early Afternoon Sessions | 14:00 16:00 |
Coffee | 16:00 16:30 |
Late Afternoon Sessions | 16:30 18:30 |
There will be three parallel sessions throughout the conference.
June 23
8:30 Welcome (M.R. Sertel)
Society for Economic Design (P.R. Kleindorfer)
Morning
MATCHINGS AND INDIVISIBLES (organized by A. Alkan)
Chair: G. Koshevoy (CEMI, Moscow)
Ahmet ALKAN (Sabanci U)
Discrete Revealed Preference and Lattice of Stable Multipartner Matchings
Vladimir DANILOV (CEMI, Moscow), Gleb Koshevoy, Kazuo Murota
Discrete Convexity and Equilibria in Economies with Indivisible Goods and Money
Aljosa FELDIN (U Ljubljana)
Core Convergence in Two Sided Matching Markets: Computational and Theoretical Approach
Dorothea HERREINER (U Bonn), C. Puppe
A Simple Procedure for Finding Equitable Allocations of Indivisible Goods
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
Chair: M. Bac (Bilkent U and U Chicago)
Benan Zeki ORBAY (Istanbul Technical U), Öner Günçavdi
Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Cournot and Stackelberg Markets
Randal HEEB (INSEAD)
Inovation and Vertical Integration in Complementary Markets
Nikolaos VETTAS (Duke U), Kamal Saggi
On Intrabrand and Interbrand Competition: The Strategic Role of Fees and Royalties
Mehmet BAC (Bilkent U and U Chicago), Parimal Kanti Bag
Strategic Information Revelation in Fund-Raising Campaigns
PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS I ( P. Kleindorfer)
Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)
Fouad BENDIMERAD (Risk Management Solutions, Merlo Park)
Risk Quantification and Seismic Hazards in the Aegean Region
Mustafa ERDIK (Bogazici U)
Earthquake Risk Assessment and Mitigation in Istanbul
Howard KUNREUTHER ( U Penn)
Public-Private Partnerships in Promoting Cost-Effective Mitigation for Seismic Risks
Tuðrul TANKUT ( Middle East Technical U)
Structural and Educational Dimensions of Earthquake Mitigation in Turkey
Paul KLEINDORFER (U Penn)
Establishing Insurance Markets for Seismic Risks
PLENARY SESSION (Matthew Jackson)
Efficiency and the Formation of Communication and Exchange Networks
Early Afternoon
BARGAINING I
Chair: C. Herrero (U Alicante)
Antonio NICOLO (U Autonoma Barcelona and U Padova), A. Perea
A Non-Welfarist Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Situations
Benan Zeki ORBAY (Istanbul Technical U)
Kalai-Smorodinsky and Mashler-Perles Solutions under Pre-Donation
Alexander SOTSKOV (CEMI, Moscow)
A Nash Axiomatization of Competitive Decisions
Carmen HERRERO (U Alicante)
Equal Awards vs. Equal Losses: Duality in Bankruptcy
DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM
Chair: A. Villanacci (U Florence)
Erdem BAÞÇI (Bilkent U), Ýsmail Saðlam
Optimal Money Growth in a Limited Participation Model with Heterogeneous Agents
Nadjette LAGUECIR (U Zurich), Hubert Stahn
Sunspots and Incomplete Financial Markets: A Numeraire Asset Approach
Sonia WEYERS (INSEAD)
Convergence to Competitive Equilibria in a Double Auction
Erkan YALÇIN (Flinders U, Australia), David Kelsey
The Arbitrage Pricing Theorem with Incomplete Preferences
PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS II ( Paul Kleindorfer)
Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)
Attila ANSAL (Istanbul Technical U)
Micro-Zoning for Seismic Risk Quantification
Polat GULKAN (Middle East Technical U)
Turkish Development Law No.3194 and New Building Construction Supervision in Turkey
Joanna PAPOULIA (Institute of Oceanography, Athens)
Challenges in Marine Seismology in the Aegean Region
Rakesh SARIN (UCLA)
A Social Decision Analysis of the Earthquake Safety Problem: The Case of Existing Los Angeles Buildings
Late Afternoon
ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLES I
Chair: S. Papai (U Nova de Lisboa)
Lars EHLERS (Maastricht U)
Coalitional Strategy-proof House Allocation
Bettina KLAUS (U Nebraska at Lincoln), Lars Ehlers
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and the Probabilistic Uniform Correspondence
Ipek SANVER (Bogazici U), Murat R. Sertel
Manipulability of the Men-Optimal Matching Rule via Endowments
Jun WAKO (Gakushuin U)
Coalition-Proof Nash Allocation in a Barter Game with Multiple Indivisible Goods
EMPIRICAL AND OTHER STUDIES
Chair: A. Malawski (U Cracow)
Wietze LISE (Vrije U, Amsterdam)
Estimation of a Noncooperative Game
Bilin NEYAPTI (Bilkent U)
Quality of Bank Regulation and its Macroeconomic Effects: A Quantitative Analysis
Andrzej MALAWSKI (U Cracow)
Designing Schumpeterian Evolutionary Economics in the Arrow-Debreu Set-up
PUBLIC POLICY AND SEISMIC HAZARDS III ( P. Kleindorfer)
Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)
Hasan BODUROGLU (Istanbul Technical U)
Considerations Behind Compulsory Insurance with Earthquake Coverage
Emil-Sever GEORGESCU (The National Building Research Institute, Bucharest)
Earthquake Risks and Insurance in Romania
Ayse ONCULER (INSEAD)
Decision Processes of Homeowners in Adopting Risk Mitigation Measures
Ioannis PAPADAKIS (U British Columbia), William Ziemba
Consequences of Earthquake Losses for Global Supply Chains: The Taiwan Experience
Andreas RICHTER ( Hamburg U ), Martin Nell
Alternative Risk Transfer Mechanisms for Seismic Risks
June 24
Morning
AUCTIONS I
Chair: G. D. Varma (Duke U)
Archishmann CHAKRABORTY (CUNY), Nandini Gupta, Rick Harbaugh
First Impressions in Sequential Auctions
Sander ONDERSTAL (Tilburg U)
Auctions with Network Externalities
Gopal Das VARMA (Duke U)
Standard Auctions with Identity Dependent Externalities
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND APPLICATIONS I (C.D. Aliprantis)
Chair: B. Allen ( U Minnesota)
Yasar BARUT (Rice U)
Existence and Computation of Equilibrium in Stochastic Heterogeneous Agent Growth Model
Bernard CORNET (U Paris I)
Spatial Economies
Hajime HORI (Tohoku U)
Non-paternalistic Altruism and Utility Interdependence
Efe OK (NYU), Tapan Mitra
Extending Stochastic Dominance Relations via Expected Utility Theory
CORPORATE FINANCE (H. Orbay)
Chair: H. Orbay (Sabanci U)
Bjorn JORGENSEN (Harvard BS)
Discretionary Risk Disclosures
Murat USMAN (Koc U)
Debt as a Remedy to the Hold-up Problem: A Multi-period Model with Debt Renegotiations
Bilge YILMAZ (Wharton, U Penn), Ernst Maug
Two-class Voting: A Mechanism for Conflict Resolution
PLENARY SESSION (David Cass)
One Economist's Designs: What Asset Pricing Theory Can- and Should!- Learn From Financial Equilibrium Theory
Early Afternoon
RIGHTS AND IMPLEMENTATION (M. R. Sertel)
Chair: M.R. Sertel (Bilkent U and Bogaziçi U)
Michael D. INTRILIGATOR ( UCLA), Dagobert L. Brito
Congestion of the Turkish Straits: A Market Alternative
Peter S. FAYNZILBERG (Northwestern U)
Participation Rights and Mechanism Design
Gianpaolo ROSSINI (U Bologna), Michele Moretto
Taking Closure Decision Efficiently
Walter TROCKEL (U Bielefeld)
Embedding the Nash Program into Implementation Theory
MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS AND APPLICATIONS II (C.D. Aliprantis)
Chair: C.D. Aliprantis (Purdue U)
Beth ALLEN (U Minnesota)
On Process Planning with Multiple Agents: How to Decide Which Process Plan to Use
Peter BARDSLEY (U Melbourne)
Multi-task Agency : A Combinatorial Model
Melike BULU (U Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), Levon Barseghyan, Nicholas Yannelis
On Coalitionally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Allocations
Myrna WOODERS (U Warwick), Alexander Kovalenkov
Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments
EXPERIMENTAL METHODS IN DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS ( T. Saijo)
Chair: T. Saijo (Osaka U)
Peter BOHM (Stockholm U), Björn Carlén
Efficient Approaches to Making International Emissions Trading Attractive to Non-Rich Countries: Theory and Experiment
Yan CHEN (U Michigan)
An Experimental Study of House Allocation Mechanisms
Tatsuyoshi SAIJO (Osaka U), Yoichi Hyzen, Takao Kusakawa, Hidenori Niizawa
Finding 'No-Regret' Strategy in GHG Emissions Trading Institutions in the Kyoto Protocol: An Experimental Approach
Late Afternoon
AUCTIONS II
Chair: M. Olson (U Arizona)
Yumiko BABA (Aoyamagakuin U)
Auctions with Heterogeneous Sellers
Ottorino CHILLEMI (U Padova)
On Non Tough Competition
Ali HORTACSU (Stanford U)
An Empirical Analysis of Strategic Bidding in Turkish Treasury Bill Auctions
NETWORK DESIGN ( B. Dutta, M. Jackson) (16:30 - 17:30)
Chair: B. Dutta (ISI, New Delhi)
Sergio CURRARINI (U London), Massimo Morelli
Network Formation with Sequential Demands
Robert P. GILLES (Virginia Tech U), Edward Droste, Cathleen Johnson
Evolution of Conventions in Endogenous Social Networks
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY I (17:30 - 18:30)
Chair: V. Kreps (IME, St. Petersburg)
Belén JEREZ (U Autonoma Barcelona)
General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Information: A Dual Approach
Viktoria KREPS (IME, St. Petersburg), Victor Domanski
Social Equilibria for Competitive Resource Allocation Models
TOPICS IN REGULATION I
Chair: Ü. Zenginobuz (Bogaziçi U)
Peter S. FAYNZILBERG (Northwestern U)
Optimal Selection of a Regulated Monopoly
Zivan FORSHNER (U Haifa)
Agency Spaces
Anne YVRANDE (U Paris, Sorbonne)
Regulatory Reform and Standardisation: The Case of the British Rail Industry
E. Ünal ZENGINOBUZ (Bogazici U), Haldun Evrenk
Using Revenue Contests in Yardstick Regulation
June 26
Morning
BARGAINING II ( C. Ponsati)
Chair: C. Ponsati (U Autonoma Barcelona)
Pablo AMAROS (U Malaga), Bernardo Moreno
Bargaining with Commitments
Joan M. ESTEBAN (IAE, Barcelona), J Sakovics
Why do Lions Get the Lion' s Share: A Hobbesian Theory of Bargaining
Özgür KIBRIS (Sabanci U and CORE)
Truthful Representation of Utilities in Multicoalitional Bargaining
Clara PONSATI (U Autonoma Barcelona)
Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY II ( A. Villanacci)
Chair: A. Villanacci
(U Florence)Svetlana BOYARCHENKO (U Penn)
On Arrow' s Theorem in a Model with Neo-classical Firms
Alessandro CITANNA (HEC)
Moral Hazard and Linear Contracts: Economies with Idiosyncratic Risks
Herve CRES (HEC)
Majority Stable Production Equilibria: A Multivariate Mean Shareholders Theorem
Birgit GRODAL (U Copenhagen), Hildegard Dierker, Egbert Dierker
The Objective of an Imperfectly Competitive Firm and Constrained Efficiency
TOPICS IN REGULATION II ( P. Kleindorfer)
Chair: P. Kleindorfer (U Penn)
Semih KORAY (Bilkent U), Harun Bulut
Regulation Through Supply and Demand Function Equilibria
Thomas KUHN (Chemnitz U), Karen Pittel
Incentive Compatible Regulation of Quality Provision by Natural Monopolies: The Role of Technical Progress
Wietze LISE (Vrije U, Amsterdam), Alberto Garrido, Eva Iglesias
A Game Model of Farmer' s Demand for Irrigation Water from Reservoirs in Southern Spain
Paul KLEINDORFER (U Penn), Michael A. Crew
Incentive Regulation: Failure of Commitment or Economic Design?
PLENARY SESSION (C.D. Aliprantis)
Equilibrium Theory With Non-Linear Prices
Early Afternoon
COALITION FORMATION ( F. Bloch)
Chair: F. Bloch (U Louvain)
Nadia BURANI (Barcelona Autonoma), William Zwicker
Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences
Sylvie THORON (GREQAM)
A Sequential Model of Coalition Formation
Sang Seung YI (Sogang U)
Endogeneous Formation of Economic Coalitions: A Survey on the Partition Function Approach
Francis BLOCH (U Louvain)
Agenda Control in Coalition Formation
SOCIAL CHOICE I
Chair: J. Laine (ENSAI)
Gleb KOSHEVOY (CEMI; Moscow)
Non-binary Social Choice and Closure Operators with the Anti-Exchange Property
Somdeb LAHIRI (IIM, Ahmedabad)
Axiomatic Characterizations of Some Solutions for Abstract Games
Laurent VIDU (U Caen)
The Minimal Quota for a Complete and Transitive Majority Relation
YunTong WANG (Sabanci U)
The Discrete Aumann-Shapley Method
APPLIED MECHANISM DESIGN ( J. Ledyard)
Chair: S. Bhattacharya (LSE)
Leslie FINE (Caltech U)
Inducing Liquidity in Thin Financial Markets through Combined Value Trading Mechanisms
Mark OLSON (U Arizona)
FCC Auction Design: An Experimental Comparison of Package and Non-package Ascending Auctions
Szilvia PAPAI (U Nova de Lisboa)
Exchange in a General Market with Indivisible Goods
Sudipto BHATTACHARYA (LSE)
Delegated Portfolio Management, No Churning, And Relative Performance-Based Incentive/Sorting Schemes
Late Afternoon
ALLOCATION OF INDIVISIBLES II (T. Sönmez)
Chair: T. Sönmez (Koc U and U Michigan)
Atila ABDULKADIROGLU (Northwestern U), T. Sonmez
School Choice: A Solution to the Student Assignment Problem
Anna BOGOMOLNAIA(Southern Methodist U), Hervé Moulin
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
Szilvia PAPAI (U Nova de Lisboa)
Strategyproof Exchange of Indivisible Goods
Tayfun SONMEZ (Koc U and U Michigan), Atila Abdulkadiroglu
Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments
SOCIAL CHOICE II
Chair: S. Chatterji (ISI, New Delhi)
Ayca KAYA (Bilkent U), Semih Koray
A Characterization of Oligarchic Social Choice Rules
Erkut Yusuf ÖZBAY (Bogazici U)
Numerical Representation of Binary Relations With Multiplicative Error Function: The General Case
Shurojit CHATTERJI (ISI, New Delhi), Navin Aswal, Arunava Sen
Dictatorial Domains
IMPLEMENTATION I
Chair: T. Van Zandt (INSEAD)
Emanuela CARBONARA (U Oxford and U Bologna)
The Optimal Allocation of Power in Organizations
Shasikanta NANDEIBAM (U Birmingham)
Efficiency in Teams With Sub-Teams
Hannu VARTAINEN (U Helsinki)
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-player Subgame Perfect Implementation
June 27
Morning
ORGANIZATIONS AND COMPLEXITY (Van Zandt)
Chair: B. Yilmaz (Wharton, U Penn)
Luis GARICANO (Chicago GBS)
Referrals
Hakan ORBAY (Sabancý U)
Hierarchy Size and Environmental Uncertainty
Timothy Van ZANDT (INSEAD)
Structure and Returns to Scale of Real-time Hierarchical Resource Allocation
SOCIAL CHOICE III
Chair: W. Gehrlein (U Delaware)
Emel FILIZ (Bogazici U)
A Structure of Joint Irreducible Sets for Classically Rationalizable Choice Operators
Jean LAINE (ENSAI), Gilbert Laffond
Single-Switch Preferences and the Ostrogorski Paradox
William GEHRLEIN (U Delaware)
Weighted Scoring Rules that Maximize Condorcet Efficiency
DESIGNING INTERGENERATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ( J. Esteban)
Chair: J. Esteban (IAE, Barcelona)
Michele BOLDRIN (Minnesota U), Ana Montes
The Intergenerational Welfare State: Public Education and Pensions
Nezih GÜNER (Penn State U)
An Economic Analysis of Family Structure: Inheritance Rules and Marriage Systems
Estephane ROTTIER (U Louvain), Geraldine Mahieu
Preferences Over Capital Income versus Labor Income Taxation
Aylin SECKIN (U Montreal)
Consumption with Habit Formation
PLENARY SESSION (Leonid Hurwicz)
Mechanism Design With and Without Games
Early Afternoon
ELECTORAL SYSTEM DESIGN (S. Koray and A. Postlewaite)
Chair: W. Trockel (U Bielefeld)
Serdar GUNER (Bilkent U)
Power Inflection and Sensitivity in the Turkish (Grand) National Assembly
Ayça KARA (Bogazici U), Murat Sertel
Selecting a Social Choice Rule
Arkadii SLINKO (U Auckland)
The Majoritarian Compromise is Asymptotically Strategy-Proof
Bulent UNEL (Brown U), Semih Koray
A Characterization of Neutral Tops-Only Self-Selective Social Choice Rules
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY III ( A. Villanacci)
Chair: B. Grodal (U Copenhagen)
Julio DAVILA (U Penn)
Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies
Esma GAYGISIZ (Middle East Technical U), Paul Madden
Coordination Failures Under Oligempory Where Firms Can Constrain Labour Supplies
Antonio VILLANACCI (U Florence), Ünal Zenginobuz
Private Provision of Public Goods and Non-Neutrality of Taxes
Birgit GRODAL (U Copenhagen), Karl Vind
Equilibrium with Arbitrary Market Structure
INCENTIVES AND TEAMS
Chair: R. Sanver (Bilgi U)
Emanuela CARBONARA (U Oxford and U Bologna)
Corruption and Decentralisation
Görkem ÇELÝK (Northwestern U)
Interested Experts: Do They Still Know More Than the Rest of Us?
Hans GERSBACH (U Heidelberg)
Incentive Contracts and Elections for Politicians and the Down-Up Problem
Late Afternoon
COALITIONAL AND EVOLUTIONARY MODELS
Chair: O. Yilankaya (UBC, Vancouver)
M. Socorro PUY (U Malaga)
Equilibrium in Mobility and Redistribution Economies
Remzi SANVER (Bilgi U), Göksel Asan
Coalition Structural Games and The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
José L. TORRES (U Malaga), Bernardo Moreno
Economic Unions and Output Subsidies
Okan YILANKAYA (UBC, Vancouver), Eddie Dekel, Jeffrey C. Ely
Evolution of Preferences
IMPLEMENTATION II
Chair: A. Slinko (U Auckland)
Haruo IMAI (Kyoto U)
Constrained Bargaining Problems
Ayça KAYA (Bilkent U), Semih Koray
A Characterization of Solution Concepts Which Only Implement Monotonic Social Choice Rules
Hannu VARTAINEN (U Helsinki)
Subgame Perfect Implementation: A Full Characterization for the Many-player Case
Naoki YOSHIHARA (Hitotsubashi U)
On Efficient and Procedurally-Fair Equilibrium Allocations in Sharing Games